Critical Theory has an uneasy relationship to philosophy, and it is a complex question whether it constitutes a philosophical position at all: it both aims to leave philosophy behind and insists on the need for it.
On the other hand, the very same authors (including notably Adorno) insist on the continued need for philosophy and require critique of philosophical positions to be, in important senses, internal to philosophy, explicitly rejecting criticisms of these positions simply in terms of the interests and social positions of their adherents. The relentless self-reflexivity mandated by Critical Theory also pushes its proponents in the direction of what has traditionally been described as philosophyconceptual investigation into conditions of possibility. Similarly, while traditional metaphysics and logical positivism are rejected unanimously among proponents of Critical Theory, when it comes to Kantian transcendental philosophy and fundamental ontology these proponents take different, sometimes opposing views (as they do in relation to religion and metaphysics). One further complication is that some of the proponents change their view of philosophy across time -for example, Habermas thinks of philosophy in 1971 mainly in terms of a critique of scientism, but by 1983 it has become a programme of justification.
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In this Chapter, I will investigate Critical Theory's uneasy relationship with philosophy. I will do so mostly by way of a case study (of Adorno's Critical Theory) . I adopt the case study approach for a number of reasons, notably two related ones: a more in-depth focus is better suited to illuminate the complexity of this uneasy relationship, and there already exist a number of overview accounts (whether thematic or chronological), 3 such that there is no pressing need for another one.
Still, as a starting point, it is necessary to take more of a bird's eye view.
When asking about the (meta)philosophical stance of Critical Theory, an initial difficulty that one encounters is typological: what characterises Critical Theory and who should be counted among its proponents?
A sort of litmus test here is whether Foucault's work is counted in or out. On the one hand, one could be easily excused for thinking that Foucault stands clearly outside of this tradition -the fierce criticisms of his work by Habermas and those influenced by Habermas (such as Fraser and McCarthy) would suggest as much. 4 And often Critical Theory is defined narrowly in terms of 'the German tradition of interdisciplinary social theory, inaugurated in Frankfurt in the 1930s' (Allen 2016: xi) .
This 'Frankfurt School' tradition is then understood in family terms along Habermas. In line with family analogy, the generations would continue: just as
Habermas was assistant to Adorno and Honneth to Habermas, some of the assistants and doctoral students of third-generation thinkers (such as Allen and Jaeggi) would then make up the fourth generation, and so on.
On the other hand, if one takes a broad view, such that Critical Theory is 'any politically inflected form of cultural, social or political theory that has critical, progressive, or emancipatory aims,' (Allen 2016 : xi) then Foucault certainly counts as 4 See (Habermas 1985 : Lectures IX-X); (Fraser 1989: Part 1); and (McCarthy 1990) . 5 See, for example, (Anderson 2011). one of its proponents. Indeed, in a late interview he said that he wished he had read the work of Frankfurt School theorists (presumably he has here particularly the works of the first generation in mind) as this would have saved him a lot of work. (Foucault 1994: 117) Also, Foucault contests that he is an anti-Enlightenment thinker, and, contrary to Habermas' criticism and much more like the Frankfurt School, places himself in its tradition of critically interrogating the present. 6 And at least from Honneth onwards, there has been a much less confrontational relation to Foucault's work among Frankfurt School theorists. Moreover, a narrow, institutional understanding of Critical Theory can come apart from its broader notion, such that at least some of the successors theorists might no longer be doing critical theorydespite what the institutional stalwarts say, one could argue that Foucault is more of a core case of Critical Theory than Habermas or Honneth. 7 Perhaps this typological question does not allow for a conclusive answer -at least not in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Some views and theorists will be core examples; many will subscribe to some shared elements (such as a commitment to emancipation or a Hegelian notion of reason), but even so the differences in how they interpret these elements will often be more important; some theorists and approaches will seem more peripheral; others still will clearly fall outside; and there will be hard cases (perhaps Foucault is one published a few months later). 9 According to Horkheimer, the traditional conception of theory -not just in philosophy, but in all of the academic disciplines -abstracts from the social functions and preconditions of theorising as well as its actual processes. In the pursuit of objectivity and impartiality, these matters seem of secondary importance -at best, they can be ignored altogether and, at worst, they are obstacles to be negotiated or conditions to be optimised, but even then, ultimately, they leave the core of theorising untouched. Similarly, the ideal is a transhistorical notion of truth -historical contexts might prevent people from seeing it, but this does not change the fact that truth itself is non-historical in nature and theory aims to track it. Moreover, on the traditional conception of theory, there is a social division of labour between academic, scientific work and politics, whereby the former either is value-free or takes the existing value orientations as external givens.
Critical Theory, as Horkheimer introduces it, differs along all three of these dimensions: its proponents deny that the social function of theorising can be neatly distinguished from its content and nature, requiring us to take a self-reflective stance on the process of theorising and its social preconditions (Horkheimer 1972: 197, 205-6, 209, 216-7 and 244) ; 10 they conceive of Critical Theory and of truth as 8 See, notably, (Adorno 1966: 358) / (Adorno 1973 365); and (Forst 2015) . (There are no reliable translations of Negative Dialektik. I refer first to the German original and then to the most commonly used translation.) 9 Both reprinted and translated in (Horkheimer 1972: 188-252) . 10 See also (Marcuse 2009: 115) .
deeply historical (Horkheimer 1972: 240) Horkheimer in this takes his orientation from two earlier notions of critique:
Kant's 'critical philosophy' and Marx's 'critique of political economy.' Like the former, he thinks that the object and the subject of cognition are pre-constituted in a certain way; but, unlike Kant, he thinks that this pre-constitution is socio-historical:
It is not only in clothing and appearance, in outward form and emotional make-up that human beings are the product of history. Even the way they see and hear is inseparable from the social life-process as it has evolved over the millennia. The facts which our senses present to us are socially preformed in two ways: through the historical character of the object perceived and through the historical character of the perceiving organ. (Ibid.: 200) 12 If anything the debts to Marx are bigger still -indeed, Horkheimer remarks that calling the theorising he has in mind 'critical' is meant 'less in the sense it has in the idealist critique of pure reason than in the sense it has in the dialectical critique of political economy ' (Ibid.: 206n14 under a mistaken self-image of theorising as self-sufficient and independent, but that, nonetheless, it also contains a 'camouflaged utopia' in its 'hypostatization of Logos' insofar as 'reason should actually determine the course of events in a future society' (Horkheimer 1972: 198) . 14 In the same vein, Marcuse argues that idealist philosophy is both ideological and utopian: it is ideological in individualising the 13 See, notably, (Brudney 1998 For its content is the transformation of the concepts which dominate the economy in its opposites: fair exchange into a deepening of social injustice, a free economy into monopolistic control, productive work into rigid relationships which hinder production. (Horkheimer 1972: 247) The idea here is that social processes (like the commodity exchanges at the heart of the capitalist economy) cannot be neatly separated from their conceptualisationthe latter are not merely brought externally to the subject matter, but are, in a sense, in them: the social processes in questions are 'real abstractions' -concepts, like 'commodity', play a role in how they function insofar as these processes, while happening in one sense behind the back of the participants (insofar as the participants do not adequately understand or control them), are also in another sense mediated by the conceptual grasp of these participants. When we, say, buy bread at our local bakery, we are -and cannot but be -operating (implicitly) with the categories of political economy. Otherwise what we would do would not be a business transaction. As a consequence, if the concepts governing social processes turn into their opposites (and it is such dialectical inversions that Horkheimer above suggests Critical Theory should investigate), then this does not leave the practices untouched, but signifies that they misfire too. This need not imply idealism -i.e., the thesis is not that the misfiring of the concepts causes the misfiring of the practices.
The point is rather that the analysis of the concepts in question can reveal something that is indicative of social tendencies. Accordingly, conceptual analysis here is understood as always implying social analysis -it is both deeply philosophical separation between scientist and citizen (which, as mentioned, Horkheimer sees as one of the hallmarks of Traditional Theory), in integrating system theory (Habermas 1981b) , 16 in broadening the causes of the present distress beyond capitalism (Habermas 1981b; Honneth 2011) , or in narrowing of the normative vocabulary to moral terms, most importantly justice.
Whoever chooses philosophy as a profession today must first reject the illusion that earlier philosophical enterprises began with: that the power of thought is sufficient to grasp the totality of the real. (Adorno 1977: 120) Adorno claims that the history of philosophy itself bears witness to this being an illusion: this history is littered with failed attempts of showing that thought can grasp 'the totality of the real,' and this reveals the doomed nature of the very enterprise.
In this lecture, he concentrates not so much on the historical attempts -we find such discussion in later works on Husserl, Hegel, Kant, and (mainly in his lectures)
Plato and Aristotle. Rather, he criticises the dominant philosophical schools of his day: Neo-Kantianism, Positivism, and Phenomenology (especially Heidegger's version thereof). This reflects his view that 'one of the first and most actual tasks' is 'the radical criticism of the ruling philosophic thinking' (Ibid.: 130).
The nature of this radical criticism is such that one might think Adorno wants to liquidate philosophy. He admits that this is how it will seem:
For the strict exclusion of all ontological questions in the traditional sense, the avoidance of invariant general concepts (including, for instance, the concept of human being), the exclusion of every conception of a self-sufficient totality of mind [Geist] , or of a selfcontained 'history of mind'; the concentration of philosophical questions on concrete innerhistorical complexes from which they are not to be detached -these postulates indeed become extremely similar to a dissolution of that which has long been called philosophy. (Adorno 1966 (Adorno : 243 / 1973 . See also (Freyenhagen 2014 it is to claim that no desire can be so strong that one would want it to be satisfied, even at the price of being executed immediately afterwards.)
The second aspect -the claim that dialectic is beyond standpoints -is more puzzling, but one thing he means is that dialectic is not a method that can be separated from its object. Generally, Adorno is highly critical of those philosophical theories which separate method and substance, or form and content. He does not deny that we can make local distinctions between these two purported poles.
Rather, his point is that we should be highly suspicious when such distinctions are absolutized -that form is separable from specific content in a particular context does neither imply that it is separable from that specific content in all contexts, nor that it is separable from all content.
One index of the fact that Adorno does not think of dialectic as a selfstanding method is that he presents it as historically indexed: dialectic is not apt in all historical contexts. Rather, it is apt specifically in our context because that context is one in which not only philosophical theories present themselves as systems which are, in fact, riddled with contradictions, but because our social world also is such a system. 28 In that sense, 'dialectics is the ontology of the wrong state of things'; and '[T]he right one would be emancipated from it, as little system as contradiction' (Adorno 1966 (Adorno : 22 / 1973 .
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Here we also begin to see the difference to Hegel, whose work exerted a decisive influence on Adorno's. The historical index of dialectic to our modern world already breaks with Hegel's notion of dialectic (as something that involves historical unfolding but is not restricted to one historical epoch). A related, but perhaps even more important, break is that Adorno eschews both the telos of absolute identity of mind and world and the trust in progress that he sees as essential to Hegel's dialectic. That is why Adorno speaks of 'negative dialectic' (Adorno 1966 (Adorno : 145, 398 / 1973 ) -nothing in the dialectic process guarantees a positive resolution of contradictions, especially not a culmination in 'absolute knowledge'; and the existing totality of which dialectic is the ontology stands forth not as reconciled state, but as 'triumphant calamity' (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 1) , and this ought to cure us of any attempts to squeeze positive meaning out of history (Adorno 1966 (Adorno : 354 / 1973 . 30 For all the benefits modern civilisation brings, it is -according to Adorno -a 'triumphant calamity' because it is characterised by a decoupling (or even inversion) of means and ends that is most clearly exemplified in the death camps of Auschwitz 28 Despite important changes since his death (including the fall of the Soviet block), Adorno, if he were alive, would view today's existing context as fundamentally continuous with the one he described in his works. 29 Translation amended. 30 For a detailed discussion of progress and Critical Theory, see (Allen 2016 Nor does it tell us how, all things considered, we should proceed (perhaps a theory that falls some distance short of its own standards is still the least bad option available).
Intriguingly, Adorno himself notes the limitations of immanent critique:
What is immanently argumentative is legitimate where it registers the integrated reality become system, in order to oppose it with its own strength. What is on the other hand free in thought represents the authority which is already aware of what is emphatically untrue of that context. Without this knowledge it would not come to the breakout, without the appropriation of the power of the system the breakout would fail. (Adorno 1966 (Adorno : 40 / 1973 31 31 Redmond's online translation used and amended. See also (Adorno 1966 (Adorno : 183 / 1973 .
We encounter here again the idea that immanent critique (and hence dialectic) is appropriate ('legitimate') because of the particular historical situation we are in (characterised as 'integrated reality'). This situation is one of untruth -untruth not in the sense that we face a world of delusion created by a Cartesian evil demon. Just the opposite: the problem is that the social world is factually existent -it genuinely shapes and dominates us. Untrue, rather, in the sense that the social world is a system of domination when it need not be and in the sense that it gives rise to false consciousness about its nature and constitution (following broadly Marx's idea of ideology). Yet the latter also means that immanent critique cannot stand on its own -it presupposes and needs to be oriented by knowledge of this untruth.
This raises at least two questions: whereby do we gain such knowledge? And how does Adorno fare better than Hegel whom he accuses of importing something external into the dialectical unfolding of immanent critique? In answer to the first of these questions, Adorno answers that negative experiences, particularly suffering, acquaint us with untruth. Such experiences range from physical pain inflicted directly as part social domination or socially caused ills (such as anti-Semitic or racist violence) to experiences of negativity resulting from highly intellectual engagement with art and metaphysical ideas. 32 While such experiences will often be mediated by a complex theoretical apparatus, their validity is not a matter of ultimate justification at the level of theorising. Indeed, Adorno is highly critical of such 'discursive grounding' -viewing it as unnecessary (we do not need theorising to 32 On metaphysical experience, see (Skirke 2012) and (Hulatt forthcoming) . To say that negative experiences play a pivotal role in Adorno's theory is not to say that Adorno understands them as encountering theory-independent facts that could be appealed to in order to arbitrate between different theories. This would be to slip into the kind of foundationalist framework that Adorno urges us to avoid -along with what he sees as the crude empiricism of Logical Positivism or the appeal to pure immediacy in Heidegger.
know that domination is an evil, even if we might need theorising in order to recognise, analyse, explain and overcome instances of it). He even claims that attempting to provide such grounding can be an 'outrage [Frevel] ' -for it wrongly implies, for example, that events associated with the name 'Auschwitz' are not paradigms of evil and could only be legitimately judged to be evils if something else held true which grounds this judgement (say Kant's original categorical imperative or that the very act of engaging in communication ineluctably but appropriately commits one to certain norms). Moreover, it also wrongly implies that these events might not be negative -depending on whether or not that something else that is said to be required as a ground could legitimate them as evils. The mere fact that most grounds are intended to legitimate them as such and would do so on reasonable interpretations is not sufficient here -for one can get the appropriate outcome for the wrong reasons (just as the mere fact that Utilitarianism might not actually license the killing of innocent people in a particular situation does not suffice to defend it). Leaving open certain possibilities -even if only theoretically -is a sign of bad character or theory.
At this point, it may seem as if Adorno is just importing a negative orientation into his dialectic where Hegel (according to Adorno) imported a positive one, and neither is more justified in doing so than the other -Hegel's discursive grounding fails according to Adorno (in a nutshell because it begs the question by assuming
from the beginning what is meant to be proven), but by rejecting such grounding, it seems as if Adorno cannot really offer anything more. The question is whether anything else might be said in favour of Adorno's negative dialectic over Hegel's positive one. One point Adorno makes is that there is a closer link between negative experiences and philosophy, indeed thinking at all, than with positive experiences.
He claims that pain and negativity are 'the motor of dialectical thought' (Adorno 1966 (Adorno : 202 / 1973 . 33 To cut a long story short, Adorno subscribes to a 'naturalhistorical' account of how conceptual thought and reason emerged: with the human animal exposed to an often hostile natural environment, they emerged out of physical impulses and drives -most generally put, the drive for self-preservation -in the face of negative experiences. drives, which it both channels and keeps in check (typically taking means for ends involves postponing satisfying our immediate impulses in the service of more longterm satisfaction of these impulses or drives that go beyond them).
Capitalism -as a way of organising production and society -is (for Adorno)
one particular manifestation of our drive for self-preservation and instrumental rationality. It is a very sophisticated 'tool' humans developed (not by some conscious, plan-directed collective effort on our part, but as the consequence of human history understood on the secular model of natural growth -purposeful, but without conscious design or control impose, and tries to recover it and make amends inasmuch as our conceptual tools allow us to do so.
Again much more would need to be said to unpack and defend this set of claims, but the important point for our context is that Adorno presents all of the three elements as already connected to negative experiences, such that bringing the latter into the critique of the former is, in one sense, not to import something external into the dialectical process, though in another sense it is. Tracing and revealing such contradictions requires a particular mode of presentation. Adorno suggests that we should write in such a way that each sentence is equidistant to the centre of the subject matter under discussion Adorno 1951: §44), and he often seems to come close to this ideal. As a consequence, one finds little argument that is developed along one continuous, linear path -if anything such a procedure is rejected as inadequate, 38 not least because the object of enquiry (the modern social world and its thought forms) is itself antagonistic and as such resists 'continuous presentation' (Adorno 1984: 163-4 (Adorno 1966 (Adorno : 44 / 1973 world of which they are part in a new way. The use of exaggeration is not accidental to it -as Adorno puts it memorably in Minima Moralia: 'The splinter in your eye is the best magnifying glass' (Adorno 1951: §29) .
Engaging in immanent critique also complicates the task of presentation (and interpretation). What Adorno says in the course of an immanent critique need not represent his own views at all, but merely serves the purpose of this critique.
Moreover, he often uses the complex terminology and ideas of the authors he discusses (such as Kant, Hegel, or Heidegger), which then require their own decoding, a task made more difficult by the fact that Adorno transfigures the terms and ideas in the course of the discussion. In general, Adorno denies that philosophical ideas can be captured in neat definitions that provide necessary and sufficient conclusions. 39 Adorno also eschews examples whenever they remain completely external or inconsequential to what they are meant to illustrate -whenever they are mere illustrations. Instead he advocates what he calls 'models': working through an issue in the particular way it appears in a paradigm case (say freedom in Kant's philosophy in the 'first model' of Negative Dialektik). Similarly, his anti-systematic stance is also reflected in his use of aphorisms (especially Minima Moralia) and, most importantly of all, the use of the essay form. He adopts the latter both for its openness as literary form and for signalling (by way of its French root of 'un essai') the fallibility of philosophical endeavours (in contrast to the certainty which (some) traditional philosophy claims for itself). 39 See, for example, (Adorno 1984: 159-60). It is, however, a mistake to understand Adorno's anti-system as anti-logicalas so caught up in presenting contradictions and aporias that it ends up flouting the rules of logic, infinitely deconstructing and erasing every step as soon as it is taken.
As he puts it in relation to the essay form:
For the essay is not situated in simple opposition to discursive procedure. It is not unlogical; rather it obeys logical criteria in so far as the totality of its sentences must fit together coherently. Mere contradictions may not remain, unless they are grounded in the object itself. It is just that the essay develops thoughts differently from discursive logic. The essay neither makes deductions from a principle nor does it draw conclusions from coherent individual observations. It co-ordinates elements, rather than subordinating them; and only the essence of its content, not the manner of its presentation, is commensurable with logical criteria. (Adorno 1984: 169) Just because one rejects discursive grounding and the idea that the world can be captured in top-down deductively organised conceptual frameworks, does not mean one foregoes stringency, exactness, clarity, structure, or even bindingness. Adorno denies that these qualities can be had only within (and thereby at the cost of) a system. Just as (musical) composition has its own stringency and logic without thereby having to be a deductive system or algorithm, so does thinking, even where it turns against its own tendencies to petrify the world and our experiences into rigid systems.
So far this case study of Adorno's theory has been an exploration that neither entered into scholarly debates around interpretation nor provided much by way of critical scrutiny. I will conclude by highlighting one crucial critical junction. There is a fundamental interpretative question as to whether Adorno's negative dialectic contains, however implicitly, a positive core; and a fundamental philosophical question as to whether it should contain it, such that if it were missing, this would undermine, even invalidate his theory. The literature is divided along both questions, but the majority of interpretations involve ascribing a positive core of some sort to Adorno's theory. 40 Perhaps in good part this is because it is widely accepted that a positive core is required. However, this widespread commitment is, in fact, problematic -or so I have argued elsewhere. 41 In particular, it overlooks the plausibility and cogency of 'metaethical negativism' -the view that the bad or wrong has normative force of its own, which can be recognised without reference to the good and the right, and which at least on occasion is sufficient for us to come to allthings-considered judgements about what to do and refrain from doing (recall how Auschwitz functions as a negative paradigm for Adorno). Also, it mistakenly assumes that every form of criticism has to be constructive in the sense of providing a positive alternative or substitute -while it might well be desirable that critique can point to such an alternative, it is not a requirement, neither in philosophy (flicking through any philosophy journal would provide illustration for that), nor outside of it (would we really require of Jean Améry that he provides his torturers with a positive alternative in order for him to be permitted to criticise what they subject them to?). If this is correct, then Adorno's negative dialectic could do without a positive core, and Adorno is right not to be afraid of 'the reproach of unfruitful negativity' (Adorno 1977: 130) . 40 See, for example, (Finlayson 2002) and (Seel 2004) . 41 See (Freyenhagen 2013: Ch. 8 ).
However, if this is mistaken, and if -as many of his successors within the Critical Theory tradition also think -Adorno's theory lacks the resources to provide a positive core of the right kind, then subsequent developments within this tradition would be vindicated in taking a different approach. Crucially, these developments thereby also change the conception of and relation to philosophy -making Critical Theory dependent on universal pragmatics or normative reconstructions of our social spheres and a reconfigured philosophy of history or constructivist accounts of justification. As noted from the outset, this Chapter does not aim to trace the morphing sequences that Critical Theory's (relationship to) philosophy has undergone, but provides a case study of one of its exemplifications -a 'model' in Adorno's sense.
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Where does this leave Critical Theory's uneasy relationship with Philosophy?
In the model case I focused on -Adorno's work -the relationship is one where critique of philosophy is combined with insistence on the need for it. Adorno's critique is directed against philosophy in the sense of theory that is committed to some combination of the following elements: the possibility of capturing the world fully in our conceptual schemes; timeless essence(s); philosophy's having to be a system; the requirement for and possibility of ultimate grounding (including of our ethical judgements); a stark division between method and substance; and the separation of philosophy from other disciplines. Adorno insists on the need for selfcritical reflection about these elements (or the works of authors which exemplify their combination). Such critique of philosophy should, thus, be in a sense internal (rather than, for example, a sociology of knowledge or a neuroscientific account that presents these thought constructions as epiphenomena). It also operates by way of conceptual innovation and rearrangement -and thereby is an heir to traditional philosophy. The need for self-critical reflection arises because Adorno thinks our existing conceptual schemes reflect and even mediate our (social) reality and thereby contribute to its wrongness, such that criticising them has to be part of social critique. In a word, he advocates philosophising with and because of a bad conscience -including, crucially, a bad conscience about the nature and function of philosophy itself.
